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ABSTRACT
Given the fact of moral disagreement, theories of state neutrality which rely on moral premises
will have limited application, in that they will fail to motivate anyone who rejects the moral pre-
mises on which they are based. By contrast, contractarian theories can be consistent with moral
scepticism, and can therefore avoid this limitation. In this paper, I construct a contractarian model
which I claim is sceptically consistent and includes a principle of state neutrality as a necessary
condition. The principle of neutrality which I derive incorporates two conceptions of neutrality
(consequential neutrality and justificatory neutrality) which have usually been thought of as dis-
tinct and incompatible. I argue that contractarianism gives us a unified account of these concep-
tions. Ultimately, the conclusion that neutrality can be derived without violating the constraint
established by moral scepticism turns out to rely on an assumption of equal precontractual bar-
gaining power. I do not attempt to defend this assumption here. If the assumption cannot be
defended in a sceptically consistent fashion, then the argument for neutrality given here is clai-
med to be morally minimal, rather than fully consistent with moral scepticism.
RÉSUMÉ
L’existence d’un désaccord sur les questions morales fait en sorte que les constructions théoriques
de la neutralité de l’État se fondant sur des prémisses morales ne peuvent avoir qu’une applica-
tion limitée, car elles échouent à motiver quiconque rejette ces prémisses fondatrices. Par oppo-
sition, les théories contractualistes peuvent s’accommoder d’un scepticisme moral et peuvent
donc éviter cette limitation. Cet article développe un modèle contractualiste compatible avec le
scepticisme et qui inclut comme condition nécessaire la neutralité de l’État. Le principe de neu-
tralité que je dérive à partir de ce modèle incorpore deux conceptions de la neutralité, soit la
neutralité des conséquences et la neutralité de la justification. Ces deux conceptions sont sou-
vent considérées comme étant distinctes et incompatibles; à l’opposé, je soutiens que le contrac-
tualisme peut en rendre compte de manière unifiée. L’opération qui consiste à dériver la neutra-
lité à partir du midèle esquissé, sans violer la contrainte établie par un scepticisme moral, repose
en bout de piste sur la supposition d’une égalité précontractuelle du pouvoir de négociation. Or,
cette hypothèse n’est pas défendue ici. Si cette hypothèse ne peut être défendue de manière
compatible avec le scepticisme, alors l’argument pour la neutralité développé dans cet article est
moralement minimal plutôt que pleinement cohérent avec le scepticisme moral.
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1. TWO CONCEPTIONS OF NEUTRALITY
In this paper, I aim to accomplish two related tasks. First, I attempt
to show that it is possible to ground a principle of state neutrality
without appealing to moral premises. In doing this, I am motivated
by the observation that disagreement on fundamental moral princi-
ples is endemic in contemporary societies. I take it that political phi-
losophy is in the business of advising me how to act in the ‘politi-
cal’ sphere; insofar as a principle of neutrality is the conclusion of
an argument which relies on a premise I think false, it cannot pro-
vide me with a reason to act. Given the fact of moral disagreement,
any theory of state neutrality which relies on some moral premise
will fail to give those who reject the premise a reason to think that
the state ought to be set up in such a way as to comply with the
principle of neutrality endorsed by the theory – there will be a prob-
lem of scope or range, as the theory won’t work for everyone for
whom we want it to work. I take it that contractarian theories avoid
this problem.2 In relying on prudential, as opposed to moral, reason-
ing, the conclusions of contractarian theories will apply to every-
one.3
Now, one might think that there are some moral propositions
accepted by everyone, or at least everyone reasonable (which we may
take to include most people). If so, then attempting to construct a
theory of neutrality without appealing to any moral premises is unmo-
tivated – we can appeal to premises shared by everyone, or we can
be satisfied that if we appeal only to those premises accepted by
everyone reasonable then we can rest easy, having done enough to
resolve any reasonable version of the scope problem. I am not entire-
ly unsympathetic to this approach, but I think we may be legitimate-
ly concerned if political philosophers are permitted to dismiss as
‘unreasonable’ anyone who disagrees with their conclusions. If we
take the fact of moral disagreement seriously then we ought to be
as morally minimal as possible when constructing a political theo-
ry, in order to avoid begging questions of those who disagree with
us.
I have a further reason to be cautious about attempting to ground
a theory of neutrality in ‘widely shared’ moral principles. The most
popular versions of such attempts appeal in some way to ‘autono-
my’. However, first, the arguments in favour of those theories are
vulnerable to what I think are strong objections, and second, while
autonomy may be a favourite value among liberal political philoso-
phers, its appeal beyond the academy is more questionable.4 It may
be the case that these concerns should give me cause to reject neu-
trality, rather than cause to decline a particular way of arguing for
neutrality. However, it remains true that I have a strong intuition in
favour of neutrality, one which seems to be shared by a reasonable
number of people. Moreover, the alternative to neutrality seems to
be some form of perfectionism, and whatever disagreement there
may be among those in favour of neutrality, there seems to be as
much or more among perfectionists (even among liberal perfection-
ists).
So, I propose to see what can be said in favour of neutrality
assuming complete compatibility with moral scepticism, the most
morally minimal starting point. It may be that this is too strong a
requirement, but when we see what sceptically consistent contractar-
ian theories can say about neutrality we can then decide whether we
wish to add moral premises to the argument. This leads me to the
second task of my paper. Having consulted the contractarian litera-
ture, it remains unclear to me what contractarians need to say about
the role of the state in promoting (or refraining from promoting)
conceptions of the good. I hope that, by the end of my discussion,
I will to some extent have clarified this matter.
My argument will take the following form. Neutrality is a noto-
riously difficult concept to pin down, and various conceptions of
neutrality exist in the literature. An influential account offered by
Joseph Raz distinguishes between two broad conceptions.5 First, we
have ‘neutral political concern’, which holds that “governments must
so conduct themselves that their actions will neither improve nor hin-
der the chances individuals have of living in accord with their con-
ception of the good.”6 I will follow Will Kymlicka in describing this
as ‘consequential neutrality’. Second, we have what Raz calls the
‘exclusion of ideals’, which holds that “governments should be blind
to the truth or falsity of moral ideals, or of conceptions of the good…
[Neither] the validity, cogency or truth of any conception of the good,
nor the falsity, invalidity or stupidity of any other may be a reason
for any governmental action.”7 I will follow the general trend in the
literature in referring to this as ‘justificatory neutrality’.8
Taking these two conceptions as touchstones for what political
philosophers have thought to be entailed by ‘neutrality’, I will exam-
ine the prescriptions (with respect to the promotion of conceptions
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of the good) that emerge from a sceptically consistent contractarian
model. I will argue that the contractarian model makes prescriptions
that approximate both of the conceptions of neutrality which Raz
identifies, and offers an explanation of the relationship between them.
Specifically, I will first argue that neo-Hobbesian contractarian the-
ories of the kind developed by David Gauthier will, strictly speak-
ing, always comply with a formal conception of justificatory neu-
trality, regardless of the prescriptions they generate, since they do
not appeal to the truth of controversial moral premises. I will then
argue that, given certain precontractual assumptions, the bargaining
principles developed by Gauthier recommend equality of preference
satisfaction, which I will claim is functionally equivalent to conse-
quential neutrality. Finally, I will explicate the relationship between
the two conceptions within the contractarian framework.
Although I will argue that the prescriptions generated by my con-
tractarian model will be similar to the two conceptions of neutrali-
ty identified by Raz, the fit will be far from perfect. As has already
been noted, contractarian prescriptions will invariably meet a formal
standard of justificatory neutrality – the Hobbesian sovereign who
coercively enforces a state religion on the grounds that doing so will
maintain civil peace is acting on neutrally justified reasons (at least
insofar as we grant that all men desire peace); however, this is not
the substantive kind of neutral justification that liberals typically have
in mind. The plausibility of the contractarian account of neutrality
will therefore also depend on its consequential arm. The key ele-
ment driving the emergence of a consequential neutrality principle
will turn out to be an assumption of equal bargaining power. I will
not have the space to defend this assumption below – my argument
will be devoted to showing that if it can be defended then conse-
quential neutrality follows. Even if no sceptically consistent defence
of the assumption can be given, the idea that every party to the
social contract should have equal bargaining power seems to be a
plausible candidate for a moral premise that could command wide-
spread support, and in combination with this moral premise, my
account yields a morally minimal argument for state neutrality.
Section 2 will address some preliminary methodological points.
Section 3 will defend Gauthier’s bargaining principles as being con-
sistent with moral scepticism and therefore prescriptions based on
them as being justificatorily neutral. Section 4 will show how one
gets from the precontractual conditions and the bargaining principles
to consequential neutrality, and will draw out the relationship between
consequential neutrality and justificatory neutrality. Section 5 will
defend the assumptions on which the contractarian model has relied
and will consider some objections. Section 6 will conclude.
2. PRECONTRACTUAL CONDITIONS
Suppose that an agent, a, is sitting on the grass in a park when he
notices storm clouds gathering in the sky. It is about to pour rain.
There is a gazebo conveniently situated a few metres away from where
a is sitting, in which he could shelter from the rain, and there is
nowhere else close by that will afford any shelter. Assume that a
prefers to be dry rather than soaked through. Given a’s preferences,
and his circumstances, I want to say that he should get up from where
he is sitting and take shelter in the gazebo. My use of ‘should’ here
is to be understood as a prudential claim – I do not want to make
any claim whatsoever as to the moral status of the act of taking shel-
ter in the gazebo. Should it be the case, for example, that the gaze-
bo is in a private section of the park, and that a would be trespass-
ing were he to take shelter, I want to leave entirely open the ques-
tion as to what a ought to do all things considered.
The example, thus stated, is composed of several elements; first,
there is a rational agent, an entity capable of possessing preferences;
second, there is the preference itself; third, there are brute facts about
the world, like the fact that it is about to rain, and the fact that the
only shelter available is the gazebo. The prescription (that a should
take shelter) is addressed to a rational agent (a), on the basis that it
is an efficacious means of satisfying the preference of the agent
(remaining dry), given certain facts about the world (that it is about
to rain, and that the gazebo is the only available shelter).
A principle of state neutrality would hold that the behaviour of
‘the state’ should be limited in a particular way, namely, in a man-
ner compatible with ‘neutrality’. As in the example of the gazebo,
for a prescription of neutrality to be sustainable it must be addressed
to the appropriate rational agents, must be an efficacious means of
satisfying some preferences of theirs, and must demonstrate how the
facts of the world in which the agents are operating interact with the
preferences of the agents to justify the prescription. I should note that
in moving from the example of the gazebo to a discussion of state
neutrality I have also moved from a prescription directed at a single
individual to one presumably aimed at a group of individuals. It will
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be necessary to ensure that this move does not invalidate the argu-
ment – any prescription will need to be rationally mandated from the
perspective of each individual agent to whom it is addressed.9 Finally,
it is possible that a prescription which is an efficacious means of
realising one of an agent’s preferences may have the consequence of
frustrating the realisation of some other preference. Any prescription
made on the basis of the argument to follow must be rationally defen-
sible from an all (prudential) things considered point of view.10 In the
argument to follow, I will be using a standard rational choice con-
ception of an agent and of the pre-contractual ‘state of nature’.11
3. PRESCRIBED BARGAINS
In order to make a prescription to a rational agent, we must be able
to show that, given certain facts about the world, the prescription we
recommend to the agent is an efficacious means by which to advance
the satisfaction of her preferences. One of the important facts about
the world in which our rational agent is operating is that it is popu-
lated by other rational agents – the context is therefore strategic. In
this section, I examine the ‘bargaining problem’, which, for any ini-
tial bargaining position, I take to be concerned with selecting a unique
bargained outcome (or joint strategy) from some set of possible out-
comes and defending this particular outcome as rationally mandated
from the perspective of any and all parties to the bargain. Given that
two agents hold preferences that cannot be satisfied simultaneously,
I ask whether it is possible to prescribe a division of preference sat-
isfaction that is rationally defensible, such that it will be rational for
each party to the dispute to accept a particular proposed division.12
Suppose that you and I are arguing over how to cut a cake; sup-
pose that we each want as much of the cake as we can get and that
we each want to avoid being stabbed by the other in the process of
contesting the cake. A resolution to the conflict between us must spec-
ify a division of the cake; such a resolution may either be agreed or
may be the result of a confrontation.13 Suppose that you open the dis-
cussion by proposing that we split the cake equally between us; this
would be a fair division, you say. Imagine that I might reply in a
number of ways. First, I might say that, for some reason, I am more
deserving of a greater share of the cake than you are, and propose
that I be given two thirds of the cake while you receive only the
remaining one third. Second, I might propose the same division as in
my first reply but this time explain that I should get more of the cake
because I need more cake than you do. Third, I might say that in
your initial proposal of an equal division of the cake you have
appealed to a moral standard of fairness to justify the division; I
might go on to say that I reject your concept of ‘fairness’ and reit-
erate my demand for the whole cake.
Each of my first two potential replies appeals to a moral standard
other than the one you have suggested, while the third rejects all such
standards. For our purposes here, each of my three replies is func-
tionally equivalent to each other in that none moves the discussion
between us beyond the bare assertion of a claim to some part of the
cake with which we began. However, unless it is possible to make a
prescription specifying a division each of us should be willing to
accept, a prescription which is rationally defensible by both your lights
and mine, then it would not appear that the problem of dividing the
cake is resolvable by rational agreement. By analogy, it will not be
possible to construct a prescription for neutrality (or anything else)
out of the strategic context in which we have imagined our agents to
be interacting without appeal to some conception of when one should
agree to a proposed contract and when one should refuse; crucially,
unless there is a non-moral (sceptically consistent) basis for agree-
ment in the cake case, we have no reason to think that there will be
one in the broader case.
Suppose we attempt to resolve the cake problem as follows. Assume
there is no rational agreement that may be prescribed; assume we
resort to force and that there is a resolution in your favour – you
stab me with the knife and seize the whole cake for yourself; assume
further that this series of events is perfectly foreseeable. Now, con-
trary to our first assumption, it does appear that there is a rational
prescription that can be made. Knowing that I will lose, there is no
reason for me to engage in a confrontation; since there is no chance
that I can gain any of the cake from entering the confrontation, I
have no reason to do so, and no reason to deny your claim to the
entire cake. Similarly, knowing you will win any ultimate confronta-
tion, you have no incentive to accept a division of the cake that
assigns to you less than you would win should you take the cake by
force.14 Next, consider a case in which the outcome of the confronta-
tion is uncertain, but can be described probabilistically, such that we
can confidently say that I have a 30% chance of winning the whole
cake, while you have a 70% chance. Applying standard conceptions
of expected utility, and following the logic of the case just discussed,
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these facts would prescribe a 30-70 division of the cake (and, of
course, any disturbance in the balance of these probabilities alters the
division prescribed).
The aim of the agents I am considering in this paper is to estab-
lish a set of rules to govern their interaction with one another. The
‘cake’ at issue for these agents consists of two elements. First, there
are resources which can be used to satisfy the preferences of the
agents (where ‘resources’ can be taken to be any available means of
satisfying a preference held by some agent, including each agent in
the world considered as a means to the ends of some other agent,
and where ‘preference’ includes preferences relating to the promotion
of a conception of the good). Second, there are rules whose content
affects the manner in which resources can be used to satisfy the pref-
erences of agents.
The distributive prescription I have described with respect to the
division of the cake, above, is similar to the position adopted by James
M. Buchanan. The elaboration of this account goes on to say that over
a continuous contest for resources (assuming one party does not
destroy the other entirely) there will emerge a balance of power, an
equilibrium in which each party to the contest will expend such efforts
and resources on predation designed to coercively acquire resources
claimed by other parties to the contest, and on defence against the
predation of other parties, as is profitable, up to a limit dictated by
the marginal return on investment in such activities. This ‘natural’
equilibrium specifies a starting point for any further agreement
between the parties – any such agreement must result in each party
doing better than he or she would under the ‘natural’, no-holds-barred
precontractual conditions; otherwise the party in question will not
agree to the proposal (and since the precontractual situation is one
in which each party employs his or her maximal coercive powers, no
party can be coerced to move beyond the precontractual state of
nature).
Unlike the example of the cake with which we were dealing above,
Buchanan’s construction of the problem includes a deadweight loss
of ‘potential cake’ due to the parties engaging in ‘wasteful’ conflict.
In our earlier example, there was a straightforward relationship
between the outcome of a confrontation and the prescribed division
of the cake – whatever division was going to be the inevitable result
of a confrontation should be the division the parties accept instead
of resorting to force. Now, however, the resort to force effectively
invests some of the cake in the process of confrontation, a part which
would otherwise be available for consumption, so there is no longer
a straightforward relationship between the outcome of confrontation
and the prescribed division. Agreement to avoid conflict changes the
size of the cake available for consumption; agreement creates a ‘coop-
erative surplus’ which must be divided between the parties to the
agreement in some way, and the division of this surplus cannot be
prescribed by projecting back from the results of a potential con-
frontation, since the surplus does not exist in the absence of an agree-
ment to forgo a confrontation.15
So, how do rational agents agree upon a division of a cooperative
surplus? David Gauthier has considered this problem in some detail.
His solution, which I will describe here, is called the principle of
minimax relative concession.16 As the name suggests, the principle
proposes to select a bargaining outcome that minimises the maximum
relative concession that any party has to make in coming to an agree-
ment. A party’s relative concession, CR, is determined to be the ratio
of X to Y, where X is the difference between the party’s most
favourable option, u1 (in which he receives all of the cooperative sur-
plus) and the proposed bargain, u2 (in which he receives some frac-
tion of the cooperative surplus), and where Y is the difference between
the party’s most favourable option (u1) and the initial bargaining posi-
tion, u* (so, the value of Y is equal to the value of the entire coop-
erative surplus). That is:
CR = u1 – u2
u1 – u*
Consider an illustrative case. Sam McGee, a prospector, “discov-
ers the richest vein of gold in the Yukon, but lacks the necessary cash
(say $100) to register a claim to it.” Grasp, a banker, is the only man
with cash available to lend to McGee. Suppose McGee offers Grasp
a 20% stake in his claim, in return for a loan of $100 to register the
claim. Let the value of the claim be x, and let this be the full value
of the cooperative surplus. Under McGee’s first offer, his own rela-
tive concession is:
CR(McGee) = x – (0.8)x
x – 0
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CR(McGee) = 0.2
Grasp’s relative concession, on the other hand is:
CR(Grasp) = x – (0.2)x
x – 0
CR(Grasp) = 0.8
In assessing how Grasp should respond to McGee’s offer, as a
rational actor, Gauthier appeals to the work of Frederik Zeuthen.
Gauthier’s formulation of Zeuthen’s concession principle states that
“the person whose ratio between cost of concession and cost of dead-
lock is less must rationally concede to the other.”
The essential intuition underlying the principle is that if you stand
to lose more than me by failing to make some marginal concession,
then any threat that you make to prolong a deadlock by refusing to
make the concession, and insisting that I should accept the commen-
surately greater concession so entailed, lacks credibility (assuming
equal rationality). If we suppose that McGee proposes to give Grasp
a 20% stake in his claim, Grasp will rationally hold out for more,
knowing that there is no one else with whom McGee can deal, and
also knowing that the cost to McGee of a failure to make a deal on
the basis of the initial offer is 80% of the claim, while the cost to
Grasp is just 20% (the part of the claim that McGee has offered), so
that by Zeuthen’s principle, Grasp will expect McGee to make fur-
ther concessions. McGee, knowing this, will make concessions up to
the point where any further concession will mean that his relative
concession would be greater than Grasp’s. In this particular example,
then, Gauthier’s principle recommends a 50-50 division of the coop-
erative surplus between Grasp and McGee. If either party demands
more than half, say 51% of the claim, then the cost to that party of
a failure to reach a deal will be more than the cost to the other party
(49%). The McGee-Grasp example illustrates an important feature of
Gauthier’s bargaining principles, which is that, in certain cases, the prin-
ciple of minimax relative concession is equivalent to a principle of
equal relative concession.17
My aim in this section has been to illustrate Gauthier’s bargaining
principles and to highlight one of their features: that in certain cases
they prescribe an equal division of the surplus that will result from an
agreement to cooperate. If we take society to be “a cooperative ven-
ture for mutual advantage” then we will need some principles for defin-
ing “the appropriate distribution of the benefits and burdens of social
cooperation.”18 Gauthier’s bargaining principles appear to fulfil this func-
tion. Once we know what the cooperative surplus of the venture is, we
can apply the principles to specify a division of the surplus. Where the
surplus is something like ‘external resources’, the principles will amount
to a theory of distributive justice.19 Where the surplus is the means of
promoting a conception of the good, the principles will amount to some-
thing like the claim that the conception of the good favoured by each
party to the bargain should, as a result of the bargain, be promoted to
the same extent. This then, begins to resemble a principle of conse-
quential neutrality. Crucially, of course, my claim is that insofar as
Gauthier’s principles prescribe consequential neutrality when applied to
the appropriate cooperative surplus, they do so without making an
appeal to any substantive moral conception of ‘fairness’ (or ‘justice’,
or anything else that would be ruled out by moral scepticism).
Now, one might reasonably suspect that a moral principle has been
allowed to slip into the argument at some point. ‘Rationality’ looks like
a prime candidate – if McGee and Grasp settle on an equal division
of their cooperative surplus because an equal division is one they can
both see as ‘fair’, then a moral principle has entered the story. However,
the McGee-Grasp example is quite explicitly designed to be ‘unfair’:
we can stipulate that the value of the vein is $1,000,000; that McGee
has devoted years of his life to searching for it; and that the loan that
Grasp provides is a mere $1. Gauthier’s principles will still prescribe
an equal division of the surplus. Does the McGee-Grasp example rely
on a background structure of property rights and rights against physi-
cal coercion? Perhaps, but the purpose of discussing Buchanan’s theo-
ry was to set the context as one in which no such background is
assumed and then to ask how rational agents would divide a coopera-
tive surplus in those circumstances. The McGee-Grasp example is
specifically addressed to that question – the background conditions
aren’t relevant to principles for dividing a cooperative surplus.20 Is it
true that any prescription based on ‘rationality’ must contain a moral
element? The purpose of discussing the initial cake example was to
argue that bargaining prescriptions can be made without appeal to moral
principles; do we now wish to say that our solution to the cake exam-
ple has a moral element, something that would trouble a moral scep-
tic? I think not.
139
ARTICLES
ARTICLES
L E S  A T E L I E R S  D E  L ’ É T H I Q U E  ! V .  4  N .  2  ! É T É / S U M M E R  2 0 0 9
4. NEUTRALITY PRESCRIBED
The final stage of my argument has already been foreshadowed. If
it is the case that in a contractarian theory, agents in the state of nature
are conceived to be bargaining over the means by which they can realise
a conception of the good, and if, given certain conditions in the state
of nature, our bargaining principles prescribe that we equalise the rel-
ative concessions made by each agent, then our social contract will
necessarily contain a provision that is functionally equivalent to a prin-
ciple of state neutrality (specifically, a principle of consequential neu-
trality). Furthermore, I claim that the prescription of neutrality has aris-
en from premises that are compatible with moral scepticism.
To complete the argument, then, consider a bargaining situation in
which the cooperative enterprise being established by N bargaining
agents is an institutional structure, such as the state, intended to regu-
late interactions between agents in such a way as to create a Pareto
optimal distribution of preference satisfaction. For simplicity, suppose
that, in order to deliver a particular cooperative surplus, P, the bargain
establishing the state requires the agreement of all N parties to the
negotiation; assume that without the agreement of all N agents, there
will be no surplus.
This situation is similar to the McGee-Grasp scenario, except that there
are now N agents necessary to yield the surplus. As before, applying
Gauthier’s construction of Zeuthen’s concession principle, each party
knows that he may rationally demand a share of P equivalent to the
share of each other – if, under any proposed bargain, a is receiving a
smaller share of P than b, and if a bargaining solution in which both
a and b receive an equal share of P is possible, while still exhausting
P, then a will not agree to the bargain until b has made the conces-
sion necessary to minimise the maximum (relative) concession.
The distribution of the surplus that results from this process con-
sists in allocating means of realising the satisfaction of preferences,
where these means are conceived of as either material resources or the
content of the rules governing behaviour within the state. Insofar as
any institutional structure that is agreed by the agents has the effect of
promoting a conception of the good held by one agent, but not by
some other (thus satisfying a greater proportion of one agent’s prefer-
ences than another’s), or has the effect of repressing a conception of
the good held by any agent when it does not also repress the concep-
tions held by all other agents, then, all other things being equal, it will
not represent an equal division of the cooperative surplus, P, and will
not, therefore, be acceptable to all agents. Since, by hypothesis, the
bargain needs the support of all N agents, each party has a veto over
the institutional arrangements, and in order to be established, the insti-
tutional arrangements will have to be ‘neutral’ between the conceptions
of the good held by the agents. In order for this claim to be meaning-
ful, it must be the case that there is at least some variance among the
conceptions of the good held by the N agents (if all agents hold the
same conception of the good, there will be no agent inclined to veto
a non-neutral bargain). Once this diversity condition is met, ‘neutrali-
ty’, understood as the requirement that the state ensure that the bene-
fits and burdens of social cooperation be distributed in such a way as
to equally promote the conceptions of the good held by the contract-
ing agents, is a necessary component of the institutional arrangements
proposed by any viable contractarian bargain.
Clearly, a number of issues with this account need to be addressed.
First, as has already been noted, the neutrality that is warranted by the
argument is a form of consequential neutrality, rather than the justifi-
catory neutrality that is usually defended in the literature.21 That this
must be the case is an artefact of the assumptions with which I have
been working in the course of the exposition. I have been conceiving
of all goals that an agent might have, including conceptions of the good
and the right, in terms of preferences that the agent wishes to satisfy.
Thus, for example, between two potential states of the world, one in
which the agent is injured, and another in which she is not, assuming
that the agent prefers not to be injured, and that all other things are
equal, the latter world is seen as representing a state of affairs that is
closer to some ideal state of affairs than the former. The agent pos-
sesses a ranked ordering of all possible states of the world, arranged
according to some (subjective) conception of value; all actions are eval-
uated in light of whether they will move the present state of the world
to a preferred state.22 The consequence for the ranking of the state of
the world in which the agent resides is the only standard by which
actions may be assessed, and hence, the agent has no interest in the
justifications for actions that alter the state of the world, only in the
outcome of the actions. Consequential neutrality is built into the con-
tractarian account of neutrality that I have given by the conception of
a rational agent that it employs – agents interested in maximising their
expected utility are, of necessity, ‘consequentialists’ (or ‘consequential
neutralists’, at least).
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Note that, at this point, all of the preferences an agent possesses
have been assimilated into the account. That is, a preference for not
being injured is now part of an agent’s ‘conception of the good’, or
at least, is part of the preference set over which the state must be
neutral. If we wish to distinguish between an agent’s conception of
the good and her other preferences, then we can imagine that the
agent may trade off state promotion of her conception of the good
against the satisfaction of other preferences she has. On the argument
just given, the state must be (consequentially) neutral in the aggre-
gate, over the whole of an agent’s preference set. By contrast, at the
end of Section 3, I suggested that where the cooperative surplus con-
sists of ‘external resources’, something like a theory of distributive
justice follows from my contractarian account, and where the coop-
erative surplus consists of means of promoting a conception of the
good, something like a principle of neutrality follows.23 From the point
of view of the rational agent, though, this distinction seems arbitrary
– preferences are preferences, regardless of whether they refer to pref-
erences about what we would, in everyday discourse, consider to be
a conception of the good or to preferences about not being subject
to arbitrary detention, or to forced labour, or to preferences about
how much fresh fruit the agent has. It is a mistake, on this account,
to conceive of theories of distributive justice and theories of state
neutrality with respect to conceptions of the good (and, for that mat-
ter, the right) as being distinct from one another.
I have argued that the contractarian account given here entails a
principle of consequential neutrality rather than the justificatory neu-
trality more popular in the literature (albeit, a principle of consequen-
tial neutrality with significantly broader scope than principles of neu-
trality are typically taken to have, and which is itself just a particu-
lar application of a more general principle of equal relative conces-
sion). The relationship between consequential and justificatory neu-
trality in contractarian theory isn’t straightforward, however. The prob-
lem with justifying an action K on the grounds that it will promote
a particular conception of the good, G (as the traditional justificato-
ry account goes), is that for any rational agent who does not share
G, the fact that K will promote G does not count as a reason to do
K. From the point of view of an agent for whom G does not repre-
sent the good, the promotion of G is simply the preference of some
other agent and has no independent value. In itself, the fact that one
agent holds a preference for G gives a second agent no reason to
contribute to the satisfaction of that preference. Prescriptions that are
addressed to agents must be means of satisfying their own prefer-
ences, not someone else’s. Contractarian prescriptions must also, then,
be justificatorily neutral – they must not appeal to some conception
of the good that an agent does not share – and this feature of con-
tractarian theory is, again, a result of the conception of rational agents
upon which the theory relies.24
Suppose there exists an agent, a, who has a preference for not
being killed, Ha. Suppose there exists a second agent, b, who also
has a preference for not being killed; call this preference Hb. Suppose
that if, and only if, both a and b perform action K, preferences Ha
and Hb will be satisfied. The fact that K is a means of satisfying Ha
makes doing K a valid prescription for a. The fact that if a does K
(and assuming b also does K), Hb will also be satisfied is of no con-
sequence to a. So long as the cost of doing K, for each party, is less
than the value of not being killed, and so long as each party has rea-
son to believe that the other will do K, then doing K is rationally
prescribed (assuming that there is no more cost-effective way of real-
ising Ha or Hb respectively). The prescription to do K does not rely
on any particular conception of the good (considered narrowly);
instead it simply requires that a and b have a preference not to be
killed. Furthermore, the prescription does not rely on an appeal to
the good masquerading as an appeal to an independently justifiable
conception of the right. The prescription addressed to a to do K does
not appeal to b’s right not to be killed, only to a’s preferences and
the fact (assumed to be true ex hypothesi) that if a does K, Ha will
be satisfied. Since nothing we have said about K stipulates that it
must be consequentially neutral with respect to the conceptions of
the good held by a or b, the prescription to do K may or may not
satisfy consequential neutrality. By contrast, it clearly satisfies a neu-
tral standard of justification, since it does not rely on the acceptance
of a controversial moral principle.25
As I have constructed the ‘K’ example, no cooperation is needed
between the parties; the structure of the interaction is such that there
is an equilibrium strategy ‘Do K’. Recall, however, that the prescrip-
tion of (consequential) neutrality with which we are concerned
emerges from a cooperative bargain. In such circumstances, cooper-
ation is motivated by a desire to realise some cooperative surplus, P.
If a needs b’s cooperation to gain some share of P, and if b can only
be motivated to cooperate by the prospect of receiving a share of P,
141
ARTICLES
ARTICLES
L E S  A T E L I E R S  D E  L ’ É T H I Q U E  ! V .  4  N .  2  ! É T É / S U M M E R  2 0 0 9
then acting in such a way as to ensure that b receives a share of P
is an instrumental means by which a can acquire a share in P. That
is, under conditions of strategic cooperation, the fact that Gb is a
conception of the good preferred by b provides a with a reason to
do Kb, an action that promotes Gb, if it is the case that the fact that
a does Kb will give b a reason to do Ka, an action which promotes
Ga, a conception of the good preferred by a. In the case with which
we are particularly concerned, where the bargaining parties are seek-
ing to establish the state, the ultimate bargain will have to meet both
the standard of justificatory neutrality (in that the prescriptions must
be justified by the lights of each individual party to the bargain) and
the standard of consequential neutrality (under the relevant applica-
tion of Gauthier’s bargaining principles). That is, the reason a ration-
al agent will possess to agree to some bargain is that the bargain
advances the satisfaction of his preferences (a neutral justification);
the reason the agent will possess to agree to the particular kind of
bargain described in this paper, one which is consequentially neutral,
is that this is the division of the benefits and burdens of cooperation
that is rationally mandated (any agent receiving a lesser share of the
benefits, or a greater share of the burdens, will rationally veto the
bargain; given the choice between a consequentially neutral bargain,
and one in which the agent receives less than an equal share of the
surplus, the prescription in favour of the former is neutrally justi-
fied). The consequential conception of neutrality that emerges from
our bargaining situation is not an alternative to justificatory neutral-
ity but rather an application of that principle in a strategic context.
5. OBJECTIONS, COMPLICATIONS, AND REFINEMENTS
In this paper, I have argued that it is possible to construct a the-
ory of state neutrality that is compatible with moral scepticism.
Employing contractarian methods, one can make prescriptions to
rational agents that do not violate a sceptical constraint. Using one
particularly well-developed contractarian account, it is possible, given
certain conditions, to generate a principle of state action which falls
within a broad conception of state neutrality and is also a necessary
component of any rationally mandated social contract. One interest-
ing by-product of the discussion has been a unified explanation of
otherwise disparate intuitions regarding justificatory and consequen-
tial conceptions of neutrality. Amoral, rational, preference-satisfac-
tion maximizers demand both (formal) justificatory neutrality and
consequential neutrality (in conditions where they may veto a bar-
gain).
To this point, my account has relied on a number of key assump-
tions:
1. That the conception of rational agents being used does not con-
tain any elements that would be excluded by moral scepticism;
2. That circumstances are such that minimising the maximum rel-
ative concession is equivalent to equalising the relative conces-
sions;
3. That the precontractual baseline for preference satisfaction is
zero;
4. That there is no cooperative surplus that arises in the absence
of unanimous agreement.
I wish to turn now to examining some of these assumptions.
The first assumption seems to me to be the least problematic. The
conception of an agent generally employed in rational choice theo-
ries undoubtedly has a normative component, but ‘normative’ is not
the same as ‘moral’, and it is a desire to remain consistent with
moral scepticism that has motivated my argument. It may be that the
conception requires independent defence, but this is not the place to
attempt such a task.
The second assumption, that minimising the maximum relative
concession is equivalent to equalising the relative concessions, is a
more complicated affair, and requires closer examination. In order
to illustrate what is at stake, let me adapt another of Gauthier’s exam-
ples.26 Imagine that Abel and Mabel are trying to establish social
institutions to regulate their interaction. In the precontractual state
of nature, Abel’s way of life consists of making wine and defending
his produce against the attacks of Mabel, whose religion commands
the elimination of all wine from the world. In the absence of Mabel’s
raids, Abel would make more wine, and it is his preference to make
as much wine as possible. Mabel’s time is divided between her raids
on Abel’s vineyard and worshipping her god; she would prefer to
spend more time worshipping her god, but needs to raid Abel in
order to destroy his wine. Suppose the two parties were to agree to
a deal; Abel would cease making wine and would grow oranges
instead; as a result, Mabel would have no need to raid Abel and
Abel would have no need to defend against any raids.
Let’s add some quantities to clarify matters. Suppose that in the
precontractual state, Abel can earn 20λ units of preference satisfac-
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tion while Mabel can earn 30µ units of preference satisfaction (we
use λ and µ to indicate that the units of preference satisfaction are
not comparable).2 Under the proposed deal, Abel will make orange
juice instead of wine, while Mabel will cease her attacks on Abel. In
the absence of Mabel’s raids, Abel would be able to produce 40 λ
units of preference satisfaction by making wine, but he has a some-
what lower preference for orange juice – suppose that, left in peace
to grow his oranges, he will produce 30λ units of preference satis-
faction. Suppose that, being free to devote all her time to worship,
Mabel will receive 60µ units of preference satisfaction.
When Mabel proposes to cease coercion in return for Abel ceas-
ing production of wine, Abel stands to receive 30λ, a relative con-
cession of one half, while Mabel stands to receive 60µ, a relative
concession of zero.2 Suppose that, by hypothesis, the only alternative
deal is one in which Mabel unilaterally ceases coercion; suppose that
in that case, Mabel would receive 20µ, representing somewhat more
time spent at worship (instead of raiding) but also representing disu-
tility due to the presence of wine in the world. The relative conces-
sion under this second proposal would be four thirds for Mabel and
zero for Abel.29 Four thirds being greater than a half, and our bar-
gaining principles requiring that we minimise the maximum relative
concession, Abel cannot expect that Mabel will concede if he demands
this latter deal, and since producing orange juice is preferable to pro-
ducing wine while being raided by Mabel, Abel will rationally, albeit
reluctantly, agree to grow oranges.
The example, thus stated, clearly exposes the extent to which a
prescription of neutrality relies on the possibility of equalising rela-
tive concessions rather than simply minimising them. In the case just
described, the facts of the world are such that equalising relative con-
cessions is not possible. Applying Gauthier’s bargaining principles
leads to a social contract in which Mabel’s conception of the good
is favoured over Abel’s – rational bargaining does not lead to conse-
quential neutrality in this instance. Consequential neutrality relies on
the possibility of equalising relative concessions, which in turn relies,
in general, on preferences that are continuous over their objects in at
least some degree.30 Suppose, for example, that Mabel’s satisfaction
varies with the amount of wine Abel produces. If this is the case,
then it is possible that there is some mix of wine and juice produc-
tion that will constitute an equal relative concession; if not, it is pos-
sible that allowing Abel to produce wine unmolested, but only for a
certain proportion of each year, would also serve to equalise the rel-
ative concessions of the agents. Ideally, we require that Abel and
Mabel be capable of putting a value on the satisfaction of each of
their preferences in terms of the satisfaction of all of their other pref-
erences – each must have an indifference curve representing all pos-
sible bundles of preference satisfaction, at a particular level of con-
cession, among which he or she is indifferent.31 Bargaining is then a
matter of finding the optimal mix of preference satisfaction while
holding the relative concessions equal. If Abel and Mabel possess
other resources (a perfectly divisible currency, say) and preferences
(having as much of the currency as possible) whose satisfaction is
tradable through side payments, then equalising the relative conces-
sion, and hence generating a prescription of neutrality, becomes much
easier. Where preference satisfaction is discontinuous (for example,
when Mabel has a preference for a law prohibiting all wine produc-
tion, and is indifferent over all levels of wine production greater than
zero), where it is not possible to apply the restriction only a certain
proportion of the time, and where it is not possible to make compen-
satory side payments of any kind, it seems likely that equalising the
relative concession will not be possible and the contractarian account
presented here will not recommend consequential neutrality.
Consider a variation of the Abel-Mabel example: suppose that Abel
will derive less satisfaction from producing orange juice than previ-
ously assumed – say that he will receive just 10λ units of preference
satisfaction if he cultivates oranges. Mabel, as before, would receive
60µ units of preference satisfaction. Cooperation, on the terms pro-
posed, would result in Abel’s preferences being satisfied to a lesser
extent than they are in the precontractual state. Hence, Abel will not
agree to the proposal. This variant illustrates an obvious but impor-
tant prerequisite for contractarian cooperation of any kind – there
must be a cooperative surplus available.32 Without a potential coop-
erative surplus, we are not in the contractarian equivalent of the ‘cir-
cumstances of justice’ and none of the arguments I discuss in this
paper apply.33 In the absence of such a surplus, there is no reason for
rational agents to cooperate at all.
If it were the case that people in the real world tended to find
themselves in circumstances without any potential cooperative sur-
plus, or tended to have preferences that were discontinuous in the
sense that Mabel’s are in the example given above, then the prospects
for any contractarian theory, and particularly a contractarian princi-
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ple of neutrality, would be dim. First, however, I take it to be rea-
sonably uncontroversial that actual social circumstances are such that
cooperation will yield surpluses. And second, given the number and
diversity of preferences that people in the real world tend, in my expe-
rience, to have, I do not think that the possibility of preference dis-
continuity should lead us to reject neutrality. There are very few peo-
ple with the kind of all-or-nothing preferences that one needs to gen-
erate the discontinuity problem.
What of my third assumption, that the precontractual baseline for
preference satisfaction is zero? Assuming there is a cooperative sur-
plus, and assuming relative concessions can be equalised, I have
argued that a form of consequential neutrality will be included in any
bargain establishing the state. The principle I have described would
require that the state’s laws, and the distribution of resources in the
world, insofar as these constitute the division of a cooperative sur-
plus, should promote equality of preference satisfaction. It should be
noted, however, that the contractarian method preserves inequalities
of preference satisfaction that result from the precontractual state, so
overall preference satisfaction is not likely to be equally distributed,
as agents are not likely to be equally (dis)satisfied in the state of
nature – the assumption to the contrary was a simplification with
which we should now dispense.
Suppose that in the precontractual state, the preferences of agent
a are satisfied to the level of Pa; suppose that agent b‘s preferences
are satisfied to the level of Pb. Suppose that the cooperative surplus
is S, and that a and b each receive an equal share of S, Si (where,
again, Si is some further degree of preference satisfaction).
Assuming...
Pa > Pb
...this implies that...
Pa + Si > Pb + Si
That is, as I have said, inequalities in preference satisfaction are
preserved by the contractarian method. The extent to which the method
produces an inegalitarian distribution of preference satisfaction will
depend on the sizes of Pa and Pb relative to Si. The larger Si (the
degree of preference satisfaction that derives from social cooperation)
is, relative to the precontractual levels of satisfaction, the more egal-
itarian the distribution. At the limit, the contractarian method
approaches a perfectly egalitarian (or perfectly neutral) distribution of
preference satisfaction as Pa and Pb approach zero.
The relative size of the cooperative surplus depends, in part, on
how we conceive of the state of nature. At one extreme, we have a
hyper-Hobbesian state of nature, in which we take life to be so nasty,
brutish, and short that agents will enjoy only a very low level of pref-
erence satisfaction (with the exception of those rare agents whose
idea of a perfect world is one in which they must survive from day
to day on their wits and their strength). A bargain premised on such
a world would seem to promise to be relatively egalitarian. A more
benign conception of the precontractual baseline, by contrast, implies
a more inegalitarian social contract. My sense is that the benefits of
social cooperation are substantial – when I contemplate the degree to
which my preferences would be satisfied in a lawless failed state, or
in a world where no technological advancement or capital accumula-
tion could ever take place, I tend to think that the proportion of my
preference satisfaction that derives from social cooperation is very
high indeed. As such, while conceding that contractarianism preserves
precontractual inequalities, I maintain that a state constructed on the
basis of the principles I have set out would be consequentially neu-
tral to a very close approximation.
All of which leaves us with my fourth assumption, the unanimity
requirement. As I have said above, all contractarian theories meet a
certain formal standard of justificatory neutrality, regardless of the
content of their prescriptions.34 In the account I have given, it is
assumption (iv) that adds some substance to the claim that what is
being discussed is an attractive version of neutrality (or perhaps even
a version of neutrality at all). This isn’t surprising, considering that
assumption (iv), which gives each party to the bargain a veto, is an
empirical claim that essentially does the work normally assigned to
a moral principle in contractualist theories such as Rawls’s or
Scanlon’s (the kind of principle that would, of course, violate the
sceptical constraint).
The egalitarian (or, as I have put it, neutral) division of prefer-
ence-satisfaction that emerges, given assumption (iv), follows from
an equality that it is built into the precontractual conditions. It is
worth noting, however, that what has been equalised is not ‘strength’
per se, but bargaining power. Merely assuming (iv) is clearly inade-
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quate, and without it, no consequential neutrality follows – the con-
tractarian prescriptions will still meet a formal standard of justifica-
tory neutrality, but the account will be so distant from the usual use
of that term that it would simply be confusing to insist on employ-
ing it to describe the constraint being applied to state action. What
we seem to be left with is the conclusion that contractarian theories
allocate to each according to her bargaining power – where this is
equal, they recommend substantive consequential, as well as formal
justificatory, neutrality; otherwise, not.
So, it turns out that in order to justify a substantive principle of
state neutrality on sceptically consistent contractarian grounds, we
need an argument that will convince us that agents in the state of
nature have equal bargaining power. I do not propose to attempt such
an argument here, as the complications that arise would take me
beyond the remit of this paper. Suppose, however, that the argument
cannot be given. If one is committed to defending neutrality, it then
doesn’t seem that it can be done without making a substantive moral
claim. Suppose we make the moral claim that all parties to the social
contract ought to have equal bargaining power (let us take it that this
will be in the form of a veto); this claim, in combination with the
argument given above, would justify neutrality. We would then have
a theory of neutrality that, while not sceptically consistent, would be
morally minimal, relying on extremely thin moral foundations. Insofar
as moral minimalism is an attractive characteristic in a theory, this
may be a useful way of defending neutrality. The challenge for any
such theory, once the sceptical shield has been surrendered, will be
to give a good account of why this particular moral foundation is to
be preferred to some other (perhaps more extensive) one.
6. CONCLUSION
I began this paper with two tasks – to defend the claim that it is pos-
sible to ground a principle of neutrality without appeal to moral prem-
ises and to attempt to clarify what it is that contractarians have to
say about neutrality. I have argued that the two main conceptions of
neutrality identified by Raz can be generated to a reasonable approx-
imation by a sceptically consistent (or, depending on the status of
assumption (iv), at least morally minimal) contractarian theory. To the
extent that the principles generated by the contractarian account dif-
fer from the pre-theoretical (or alternatively theorised) conceptions of
neutrality with which we began, my account is obviously revisionist.
In its favour, I would argue that it is theoretically more parsimonious,
offering a unified account of justificatory and consequential neutral-
ity, as well as of the relationship between the right and the good, and
between theories of neutrality and theories of distributive justice.
However, I don’t imagine that moral realists, for example, will have
to search high and low for ways in which to criticise it. In conclu-
sion, then, let me reiterate that the argument presented here is moti-
vated by the conviction that, at least some of the time, we need to
be able to engage in political debate with people who do not share
our fundamental moral commitments. And I don’t see how we can
do that without being willing to refrain from basing our arguments
on what we take to be the moral truth.
145
ARTICLES
ARTICLES
L E S  A T E L I E R S  D E  L ’ É T H I Q U E  ! V .  4  N .  2  ! É T É / S U M M E R  2 0 0 9
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ackerman, Bruce A. 1980. Social Justice in the Liberal State. New Haven; London:
Yale University Press.
Arneson, Richard J. 1990. “Neutrality and Utility” in the Canadian Journal of
Philosophy, 20:2, pp. 215-240.
Barry, Brian. 1995. Justice as Impartiality. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Buchanan, James M. 1975. The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Binmore, Ken. 1993. “Bargaining and Morality” in Rationality, Justice and the
Social Contract, eds. David Gauthier and Robert Sugden. New York; London:
Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Carroll, Ian J. 2006 (unpublished). On Scepticism, Neutrality and the Social
Contract, thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for a degree of
MPhil in Politics at the University of Oxford.
Danielson, Peter. 1991. “The Lockean Proviso”, Ch. 7 in Contractarianism and
Rational Choice: Essays on David Gauthier’s Morals By Agreement, ed. Peter
Vallentyne. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Darwall, Stephen (ed.). 2003. Contractarianism/Contractualism. Oxford: Blackwell
Publishing.
De Marneffe, Peter. 2006. “The Slipperiness of Neutrality” in Social Theory and
Practice, 32:1, pp. 17-34.
De Marneffe, Peter. 2007 (unpublished). “The Possibility and Desirability of
Neutrality”, paper presented at the Liberal Neutrality: A Re-evaluation conference
hosted by the Centre de Recherche en Éthique de l’Université de Montréal and
McGill University.
Dworkin, Ronald. 1981a. “What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare” in
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 10:3, pp. 185-246.
Dworkin, Ronald. 1981b. “What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources” in
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 10:4, pp. 283-345.
Galston, William A. 1991. Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the
Liberal State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gauthier, David. 1986. Morals By Agreement. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Gauthier, David. 1988. “Moral Artifice” in Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 18:2,
pp. 385-418.
Gauthier, David, and Robert Sugden (eds.). 1993. Rationality, Justice and the Social
Contract, eds. David Gauthier and Robert Sugden. New York; London: Harvester
Wheatsheaf.
Hampton, Jean. 1991. “Equalizing concessions in the pursuit of justice: A discus-
sion of Gauthier’s bargaining solution”, Ch. 10 in Contractarianism and Rational
Choice: Essays on David Gauthier’s Morals By Agreement, ed. Peter Vallentyne.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hausman, Daniel M. 1995. “The Impossibility of Interpersonal Utility Comparisons”
in Mind (New Series), 104:415, pp. 473-490.
Hobbes, Thomas (ed. Richard Tuck). 1991. Leviathan. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Kraus, Jody S. 1993. The Limits of Hobbesian Contractarianism. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Kymlicka, Will. 1989. “Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality” in Ethics,
99:4, pp. 883-905.
Laver, Michael. 1997. Private Desires, Political Action: An Invitation to the Politics
of Rational Choice. London: Sage Publications.
Morris, Christopher W. 1991. “Moral standing and rational-choice contractarian-
ism”, Ch. 6 in Contractarianism and Rational Choice: Essays on David Gauthier’s
Morals By Agreement, ed. Peter Vallentyne. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Narveson, Jan. 1991. “Gauthier on distributive justice and the natural baseline”,
Ch. 9 in Contractarianism and Rational Choice: Essays on David Gauthier’s Morals
By Agreement, ed. Peter Vallentyne. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Nozick, Robert. 1974. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Oxford; Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Blackwell.
Rawls, John. 1993. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.
Rawls, John. 1999. A Theory of Justice (Revised Edition). Cambridge,
Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Raz, Joseph. 1986. The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Scanlon, Thomas. 1998. What We Owe To Each Other. Cambridge, Massachusetts:
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
146
ARTICLES
ARTICLES
L E S  A T E L I E R S  D E  L ’ É T H I Q U E  ! V .  4  N .  2  ! É T É / S U M M E R  2 0 0 9
Sher, George. 1997. Beyond Neutrality: Perfectionism and Politics. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Vallentyne, Peter (ed.). 1991a. Contractarianism and Rational Choice: Essays on
David Gauthier’s Morals By Agreement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Vallentyne, Peter. 1991b. “Gauthier’s Three Projects”, Ch. 1 in Contractarianism
and Rational Choice: Essays on David Gauthier’s Morals By Agreement, ed. Peter
Vallentyne. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Zeuthen, Frederik. 1930. Problems of Monopoly and Economic Welfare. London:
George Routledge & Sons, Ltd.
147
ARTICLES
ARTICLES
L E S  A T E L I E R S  D E  L ’ É T H I Q U E  ! V .  4  N .  2  ! É T É / S U M M E R  2 0 0 9
NOTES
1 Many people have contributed helpful comments on drafts of this paper. I
would like to particularly acknowledge the generosity of Daniel McDermott,
Stuart White, Seth Lazar, Christopher Nathan, Kieran Oberman, Robert Jubb,
Laurens van Apeldoorn, David Miller, the anonymous referees for this journal,
and participants at the University of Oxford’s Graduate Political Theory
Workshop, the Liberal Neutrality: A Re-evaluation conference organised by the
Centre for Research in Ethics at the University of Montréal (CRÉUM), and
the Nuffield Political Theory Workshop hosted by Nuffield College, Oxford.
This work has been supported by the Arts and Humanities Research Council
of the United Kingdom.
2 For a discussion of the distinction between ‘contractarian’ and ‘contractualist’
theories, see Darwall (2003, pp. 1-8). For the most part, in this paper, I will
be concerned with a contractarian theory similar to that presented by David
Gauthier (1986), although my focus will be the political sphere, as opposed to
morality in general.
3 See Kraus (1993, pp. 27-36) on the normative minimalism of neo-Hobbesian
contractarianism. For a critique of attempts to ground neutrality in scepticism,
see Sher (1997, pp. 140-155). I do not have the space here to consider Sher’s
view in detail. Briefly, my view is that the success of Sher’s arguments depends
either on an implausible understanding of ‘scepticism’ as ‘normative scepticis-
m’ rather than ‘moral scepticism’, or on the putative neutralist being commit-
ted to claiming that moral scepticism about ‘the good’ is justified, but that
moral scepticism about ‘the right’ is not justified. I hold neither of these posi-
tions.
4 For a discussion of attempts to ground neutrality in autonomy, see Sher (ibid.,
pp. 45-105). See, inter alia, the discussions by Ackerman (1980, pp. 10-12),
Raz (1986, pp. 110-162), Arneson (1990), Galston (1991, pp. 79-117), Sher
(1997, pp. 20-44), and De Marneffe (2006; 2007).
5 Op. cit.
6 Ibid., p. 108. See also Sher (1997, pp. 3-4); Kymlicka (1989, pp. 883-886).
7 Op. cit., p. 108.
8 See Sher, Kymlicka (op. cit.). According to Sher’s summary of the distinction
between the two conceptions, consequential neutrality “asserts that governments
may not adopt and laws or policies that have the effect of promoting any par-
ticular conceptions of the good” whereas justificatory neutrality “asserts only
that governments may not take actions in order to promote any such concep-
tions” (op. cit., p. 4, emphasis in original). I am at this point, for the sake of
brevity, eliding the argument that would be needed to connect prescriptions
made to each member of a group regarding the social institutions the group
ought to establish with prescriptions addressed to those institutions themselves.
I have noted that a principle of state neutrality is a prescription addressed to
the state, but I take it to be clear that a prescription to the members of a group
to establish an institution with a particular character (namely, an institution
which is itself prescribed to act in accordance with a principle of neutrality)
will accomplish the same task as a prescription addressed directly to the state.
9 A point of view which considers all prudential reasons, and not simply some
subset of prudential reasons, but no moral reasons. As noted above, I am not
concerned here with the relationship between prudential reasons and moral rea-
sons.
10 See Gauthier, 1986, pp. 21-26; Kraus, 1993, pp. 5-6; Laver, 1997, pp. 18-25.
I depart from the standard conception in only one significant respect: I per-
mit the agents under consideration to have tuistic preferences (preferences that
relate in a variety of ways to the preferences and circumstances of other agents).
For a discussion of the various forms of non-tuism found in the standard con-
ception, see Morris (1991, pp. 91-92). For the purposes of this paper, I neg-
lect the ‘compliance problem’ in order to focus on the bargaining problem (see
Gauthier, 1986, pp. 157-189). It may be argued that it would not be rational
to agree to a bargain unless one also intends to comply with it, or believes
that others would comply with it. To the extent that this is true, my argument
is incomplete without some account of compliance, which I do not have the
space to give here. I thank Robert Jubb and Laurens van Apeldoorn for press-
ing this point.
11 I assume that there is no pressing need to resolve the dispute quickly, and that
agents prefer to avoid costly conflict where possible, and note that if discus-
sion fails to resolve the dispute, the option of conflict remains open. See
Ackerman (1980, pp. 31-68).
12 Suppose it is objected that this claim is too quick – even if I can’t win any
of the cake, I might want to go down fighting rather than meekly surrender,
or I might want to ensure that future opponents take my threats seriously, and
so stay in the fight as long as possible. These considerations certainly do alter
the situation, but they do so because now it is no longer the case that my pref-
erences consist only in getting cake and avoiding being stabbed. Clearly, a the-
ory that makes prescriptions to agents on the basis of their preferences will
be sensitive to variations in those preferences. So long as the preferences of
the agents are limited to those I set out, I contend that my conclusion follows,
while granting that were the agents to have different preferences, a different
conclusion would follow. On this point, see Buchanan (1975, pp. 8-11); also
Dworkin (1981b, p. 283). Op. cit., pp. 17-34. We need to be careful here; this
argument holds for a two-person world but not necessarily otherwise (though
it remains true that no party can be coerced to move from a state of affairs
in which she exerts her maximal coercive powers, for any given maximal coer-
cive powers arrayed against her). One common initial reaction to contractari-
an theories runs as follows: If I am stronger than you, why can’t I simply
coerce you into giving me what I want – why would I bother to bargain with
you? Gauthier’s reply to this objection comes in the form of his ‘Masters and
Slaves’ example. Very briefly, the point is that coercion is costly. If the slaves
would obey the masters without coercion, the masters would be spared the
need to coerce the slaves. There is, therefore, a cooperative surplus available
for division between the masters and the slaves – the situation in which the
masters coerce the slaves is Pareto suboptimal and rational agents should move
to an optimal situation instead. If, by contrast, there is no cooperative surplus
available, then neither party can costlessly improve the state of the world in
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which the other exists. While this is possible, most of the examples of coer-
cion that people have in mind when they initially challenge contractarianism
are not instances where there is no potential cooperative surplus. See Gauthier,
1986, pp. 190-232. “…in any co-operative interaction, the rational joint strat-
egy is determined by a bargain among the co-operators in which each advances
his maximal claim and then offers a concession no greater in relative magni-
tude than the minimax concession.” (Gauthier, 1986, p. 145; see ibid. pp. 129-
146 for details; see Vallentyne (1991b, pp. 7-9) for a summary of Gauthier’s
explanation.) According to Gauthier, the method avoids any interpersonal com-
parison of utility (1986, p. 63; p. 136). Obviously, Gauthier’s is not the only
theory of bargaining available, but it is one of the most well-developed. I do
not have the space in this paper to consider objections to the theory, or the
implications those objections would have for my argument (see ibid., p. 130,
especially note 14). Gauthier’s bargaining theory has been sharply criticised by,
for example, Ken Binmore (1993, pp. 141-155).Gauthier, 1986, p. 153. See
Zeuthen, 1930, pp. 104-121. Gauthier, 1986, pp. 74-75. See ibid., p. 140.
Suppose that, at this point, the following objection is raised. Suppose that Grasp
insists on 80% of the claim, and simply refuses to budge on the matter. Grasp
is a wealthy banker; he can afford to wait McGee out, refusing to compromise
while living comfortably. McGee, on the other hand, can’t afford to delay. If
he doesn’t settle the claim, he won’t be able to buy food. It is important to
realise that the details that have just been added to the example have substan-
tively altered it. If Grasp’s cooperation is needed in order for McGee to avoid
starving, then avoiding starvation is a component of the cooperative surplus.
Altering the composition of the cooperative surplus changes the prescribed
division of the surplus. Given the additional details, the bargaining position of
the parties has changed, and the bargaining outcome will also change. Gauthier’s
principles will still recommend an equal division of the cooperative surplus,
but the cooperative surplus is now the vein of gold plus some other things.
Note also that although the example itself is set up in such a way that time
passes between ‘rounds’ of offers and counter-offers, this is just for ease of
explanation – the example is supposed to model ideally rational agents who
will immediately recognise the rationally prescribed bargaining solution. Rawls,
1999, p. 4. Insofar as contractarians may use the term. Rawls tells us that “to
each according to his threat advantage is not a principle of justice.” (Ibid., p.
122; see also pp. 115-116.) Whether or not the theory presented is a theory
of distributive justice in Rawls’s sense does not seem to me to be important
– it is certainly a theory about how the burdens and benefits of social coop-
eration should be distributed.
13 Gauthier, I should note, argues that Buchanan’s is not the appropriate starting
point for bargaining (see 1986, pp. 190-232). I have argued elsewhere that
Gauthier’s position, which relies on his account of the compliance problem, is
unsustainable (see 2006 (unpublished), pp. 49-54; see also Danielson, 1991;
and Narveson, 1991). The possibility that some subset of N can realise some,
or all, of the cooperative surplus introduces many more complications, and I
cannot consider these in this paper. I will return to the implications of this
assumption below (see also Gauthier, 1988). I should at this point address,
briefly, the reason why consequential accounts of neutrality are so rare in the
literature, compared to justificatory accounts. Consequential neutrality is gen-
erally thought to be vulnerable to easy and immediate refutation once it is
noted that, as a matter of practical fact, it is impossible for the state to be con-
sequentially neutral among different conceptions of the good. Even basic state
functions such as national defence will require an army, for example, and the
effective functioning of that army will involve promoting discipline and loyal-
ty among the soldiers. This will mean that the state is in the business of pro-
moting discipline and loyalty, and an external effect of this will be the pro-
motion (or facilitation) of conceptions of the good which prize discipline and
loyalty (see Sher, 1997, pp. 3-5). There are two responses to this. First, and
more prosaically, these kinds of responses do not always consider whether,
assuming the state needs to act in ways that promote certain conceptions of
the goods over others, it may consequently compensate other conceptions of
the good by promoting them in other ways (see also the remarks about non-
strategic convergence on K, pp. 10-11, infra). However, it may be objected fur-
ther that this is simply impractical – there is no way to measure the degree to
which a conception of the good is being promoted as a byproduct of the nec-
essary actions of the state, and no reason to think that we can compensate all
conceptions of the good equally. My second response would then be to note
that the argument in this paper is supposed to be a form of ideal theory, rather
than non-ideal theory (see Dworkin, 1981a, pp. 190-191; p. 197; see also Raz,
1986, p. 120). Paraphrasing Dworkin, any society dedicated to achieving a ver-
sion of consequential neutrality could at best only do a rough job, and could
have only a rough idea how well it was doing. For the purposes of ideal the-
ory, our question is, if (impossibly) we could achieve consequential neutrality,
ought we to do so? Much more work would have to be done to relate the argu-
ment I have made to real-world, pragmatic policy concerns. This paper address-
es itself to questions in ideal theory, and not to questions of public policy.
14 It may be thought that this is an implausibly demanding conception of an
agent’s preferences. My claim is not, however, that agents must at all times
have such a ranked ordering at the forefront of their minds, but simply that,
when presented with any two worlds, they be able to express a preference rela-
tion with respect to the worlds (including the possibility of an indifference
relation), and that over all worlds with which the agent could be presented, the
preference relations expressed would comply with the transitivity requirement.
On this point, compare Arneson (1990, p. 218). Consider a further objection
that may be offered against my argument. Rather than claim that the contrac-
tarian account I have described cannot provide prescriptions that are compati-
ble with moral scepticism, or that the prescriptions it provides do not satisfy
justificatory neutrality because they are not neutral, this further objection will
say that the contractarian account does not satisfy justificatory neutrality
because it does not supply justifications at all. Justification, on this reading,
is an ineliminably moral concept. The fact that I would prefer to give the high-
wayman my money rather than lose my life does not justify my giving of my
money to the highwayman, since the highwayman is not entitled to my money
(see Ackerman, 1980, pp. 37-38; compare Galston, 1991, p. 90). It should be
149
ARTICLES
ARTICLES
L E S  A T E L I E R S  D E  L ’ É T H I Q U E  ! V .  4  N .  2  ! É T É / S U M M E R  2 0 0 9
clear from the discussion that I am using a significantly thinner conception of
justification; giving my money to the highwayman is rationally justified, if not
morally justified. If the point is pressed that what political philosophy is inter-
ested in, or ought to be interested in, is moral justification, I cannot offer any
reply here. I will simply note that the objection is a direct attack on contrac-
tarianism per se, and not specifically on any arguments that I make in this
paper.
15 The very strength of this conclusion is a threat to the plausibility of the the-
ory. On this account, any contractarian prescription will comply with justifi-
catory neutrality, regardless of its content. A contractarian theory which pre-
scribed a theocratic state would be formally ‘neutral’ – the justification for the
theocracy would not rely on the assertion of the truth of any religious claims,
and such a prescription is conceivable, given certain precontractual distribu-
tions of preferences. Insofar as such a result is possible, one may be inclined
to dismiss this kind of ‘neutrality’ as an empty formalism – certainly, it is a
long way from the neutrality that liberal political philosophers have typically
endorsed (compare Raz, 1986, pp. 128-130). The matter may not be quite so
clear cut, however (see de Marneffe, 2007, p. 7; also 2006, pp. 21, 29-30). De
Marneffe asks us to consider “the reason to prohibit homosexual sodomy that
a majority disapproves of it.” Proponents of neutrality have traditionally wished
to exclude such reasons as non-neutral, but as de Marneffe notes, there is no
logical entailment that the state is basing its decision on the truth of the claim
that homosexual sodomy is sinful, or wrong, or degrading. Whether the rea-
son is a good one or not, or whether or not a liberal would agree with it, in
what way is it non-neutral? See 1986, pp. 140-141; see also Hampton, 1991,
pp. 151-155; Gauthier, 1988, pp. 390-394. Hampton (op. cit., pp. 151) express-
es concern on this point; see Hausman (1995) for a rejoinder.
16 Recall that one’s relative concession under some particular proposal is the ratio
of X to Y, where X is the difference between getting the whole cooperative
surplus and the share that one receives under the proposal, and Y is the dif-
ference between getting the whole cooperative surplus and getting the precon-
tractual payoff (see pp. 6-7, supra). Thus, for Abel, if he got the whole of the
cooperative surplus he would receive 40λ, and under the proposed deal he will
receive 30λ, making X = 10λ; the whole of the cooperative surplus being 40λ,
and the precontractual payoff for Abel being 20λ, Y = 20λ. The ratio of X to
Y, Abel’s relative concession, is 10λ/20λ, or one half. Similarly for Mabel, X
= 60µ – 60µ = 0; Y = 60µ – 30µ = 30µ. Mabel’s relative concession is 0/30µ,
or zero.
17 The concession for Mabel is greater than one because unilaterally ceasing coer-
cion would move Mabel to a situation that is worse than the precontractual
state.
18 All of the bargaining prescriptions continue to satisfy formal justificatory neu-
trality. Note that we require that the agents be able to rank the value of their
own bundles of preference satisfaction; I do not mean to suggest any interper-
sonal comparison here.
19 See n20, supra.
20 Compare Rawls’s account of the circumstances of justice: “…many individu-
als coexist together at the same time on a definite geographical territory. These
individuals are roughly similar in physical and mental powers; or at any rate,
their capacities are comparable in that no one among them can dominate the
rest. They are vulnerable to attack, and all are subject to having their plans
blocked by the united force of the others. Finally, there is the condition of
moderate scarcity… Natural and other resources are not so abundant that
schemes of cooperation become superfluous, nor are conditions so harsh that
fruitful ventures must inevitably break down.” (1999, pp. 109-110, but see also
pp. 111-112.)
21 See n34, supra. See Rawls, 1999, p. 120-122; Scanlon, 1998, p. 33. The rela-
tionship between strength and bargaining power is not straightforward. Consider
a parliament in which two parties hold 49 seats each, and a third holds 2 seats.
Assume that 51 votes are needed to pass any measure. In this instance, despite
the vast differences in ‘strength’ between the third party and the other two,
each party in the parliament has equal bargaining power – the agreement of
two parties is required to pass a measure, and any two parties will do. See
Laver, 1997, pp. 138-140; compare Hobbes, 1991, pp. 86-87; also Rawls, 1999,
pp. 109-110.
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